Airservices said the new system would be safer for passengers.

Internal reviews of September rollout identifying safety issues

Safety assessment of implementation identifying significant risks - “Although SIDs and STARs are widely used at other aerodromes this is the first introduction at a significant non-surveillance aerodrome. In particular the introduction of the amount of changes at the same time, including the widespread use of GNSS standards and the removal of the VOR/DME [navigation beacon]”.

Hobart SID/STAR Safety Post Implementation Review Report – Volume 1 , effective 4th November 2017. Initial report prepared by a senior mainland-based Air Traffic Controller identifies risks are above acceptable range.

Introduction of RNP 1 SIDS/STARS at Hobart Post Implementation Review (PIR), 4th December 2017. Report from consultant identifies system only safe under ‘normal’ conditions.

Introduction of RNP 1 SIDS/STARS at Hobart Post Implementation Review (PIR), December 2017. Version of consultant report modified by Airservices.

Incident reports

14 Sep 2016 - 14 Feb 2018 - Two reported losses of separation, 9 reported operational deviation (failure to comply with altitude restrictions) post 14 September 2017. Nil in previous year prior to implementation.

Emails from Hobart air traffic controllers

1 Nov 2017 - Email raising initial concerns re safety incidents

25 Nov 2017 - Email raising safety concerns about removal of ground-based VOR beacon

15 December 2017 - Email raising more concerns about inability of flight management systems to meet requirements of new paths - “IFP have been clear that this type of airspace management is legitimate and safe but the evidence is suggesting there is work to be done”

3 Jan 2018 - Email from manager proposing removal of automated control as temporary fix for safety problems - “I need to get something in the system for us until we get time to review the occurrences with the airlines and CASA to try and determine why it is so hard to fly these procedures”

9 Jan 2018 - Email from manager suggesting safety incidents are due to pilot error

10 Jan 2018 - Email raising concerns that safety incidents are expanding - “Whilst we are looking at local actions to mitigate the potential for loss of separation, had one already, it is concerning that these are occurring with RPT operators not just itinerant. Or non FMS managed aircraft.”

18 Jan 2018 - Email urgently cancelling automated control until further notice following near miss

22 Jan 2018 - Email referring to airline concerns about safety issues - “I suspect we all assumed the FMS [on-board flight management system] would simply follow the procedure however reality indicated too many non-compliances to be welcome”

15 Feb 2018 - Email raising concerns about lack of flexibility and increased workload due to new flight path and temporary fix - “That having only one RNP1 SID [departure path] available is problematic is not surprising to anyone working at HB TWR. There needs to be other SID’s available to better manage traffic separation and efficiency”

2 May 2018 - Email from manager continuing to extend temporary fix

Temporary fix

Temporary Local Instruction requiring controllers to take over manual control of new paths to mitigate safety issues

Senate Estimates

Transcript of Airservices CEO Jason Harfield being questioned about safety issues at Senate Estimates on 22 May 2018

Federal Court papers

Application lodged with Federal Court asserting that safety was not first priority in implementing flight paths

CASA correspondence

Email from CASA denying knowledge of safety issues arising from new flight paths


Airservices said the new system would be more efficient for airlines.

Airservices internal assessment

Introduction of RNP 1 SIDS/STARS at Hobart Post Implementation Review (PIR), December 2017. Version of consultant report modified by Airservices, acknowledging that new flight paths are less efficient (i.e. longer) than pre-September 2017 paths.

Safety assessment of implementation - “Some arrivals will result in higher track miles being flown, with others having a reduction in track miles … With a reduction in the available standard arrival and departure paths there may be some delays due to mix of traffic.”

Industry feedback

Summary of airline feedback - “Industry stakeholders reported that they have been forced to absorb the inefficiencies due to the 2017 procedure changes, and would appreciate every effort being made to implement proposed efficiency changes as soon as possible”

Airlines of Tasmania submission to Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee - “Over the last 24 months, CASA/Airservices have mandated additional instrumentation to be carried on most of our aircraft. This was Airservices wishing to remove ground-based equipment for primarily cost saving measures. This equipment, including new GPS units and new ADSB transponder equipment did not result in any benefit to our operations and was simply a cost …. In theory, this was done to make airspace more efficient, however in Hobart and the lack of the use of radar being used … we are flying extra track miles.”


Airservices said that residents would not notice the changes.

Airservices’s initial Environmental Assessment said that a number of communities would be newly overflown

Airservices’s initial Stakeholder Engagement Strategy and subsequent public communications said that no new communities would be overflown

Airservices’s Case study of the Hobart implementation “The community that has been effected by the introduction of the changes has lost faith in Airservices ability to deliver accurate, genuine information, along with a solution that will both be acceptable to residents regarding aircraft noise outcomes and operationally viable for aircraft and airspace management …. This was recently demonstrated in Hobart, where a planned airspace change was implemented without appropriate identification and analysis of the impact of that change on the community.”

Airservices Executive paper estimating that the review of implementation is likely to cost over $1 million


Hobart is the fastest growing airport in Australia, with 2.62 million passengers per year and rising, but still classified as a regional airport (Class D) by CASA. CASA is responsible for ensuring its airspace classification and air traffic management system is appropriate for the volume of passengers. It is required to conduct a risk review when passenger numbers exceed 1 million per year.

2009 independent consultant report commissioned by CASA recommending Hobart be upgraded to Class C to improve safety

Correspondence from CASA refusing to comply with Australian Aviation Policy Statement and their own recommendations to conduct a risk review of Hobart Airport